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NONOPERATOR VERSUS OPERATOR AND OTHER OIL AND
GAS OPERATIONS-RELATED CASES

Court addresses dispute concerning timely commencement of
operations, fiduciary duty claims, and contractual duty of
good faith under the 1989 Model Form Operating
Agreements.

In Bays Exploration, Inc. v. PenSa, Inc., Bays and PenSa had executed operating agreements naming Bays operator of the wells at is-

sue in the lawsuit, and they had also entered into an Area of Mutual
1. Mark D. Christiansen works in the areas of energy litigation and energy law
for the Oklahoma City office of Crowe & Dunlevy, a professional corporation.
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Interest letter agreement ("AMI Agreement"). 2 Bays sued PenSa asserting ten claims for relief. Bays sought partial summary judgment
for certain of the claims and counterclaims that related to Bays's operation of the jointly owned wells and properties. The parties agreed
that Oklahoma law governed their disputes.
The first issue presented was PenSa's contention that its affirmative
election to not participate in the Brinlee Ann Marie well did not result
in the relinquishment of PenSa's interest because Bays allegedly failed
to commence operations on the well by the August 19, 2006 deadline
under the operating agreement. While PenSa conceded that Bays
built the drilling location on June 13, 2006, PenSa noted that Bays did
not set casing until September 15, 2006. PenSa argued that there was
little activity during the intervening three-month period, which provided proof that Bays did not commence operations in good faith.
The court found that PenSa's argument was contrary to applicable
law:
"[I]t is generally held that acts which are preparatory to drilling are
sufficient to constitute the commencement of a well and that it is
not essential that the lessee be in the process of making hole." 21st
Century Inv. Co. v. Pine, 734 P.2d 834, 840 (Okla.Civ.App.1986)
(quoting 3 E. Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 32.3 at

70 (1967) ("Kuntz")). "A lessee has commenced a well if he has
conducted operations on the land in good faith preparation for the
drilling of a well for oil or gas and has continued the operation in
good faith and with diligence." Id. (quoting Kuntz § 32.3 at 69).
Thus, preparatory operations such as building the drilling pad or
even transporting the drilling rig to the location are considered sufficient to constitute commencement of operations. 21st Century, 734

P.2d at 840.3
The court also found that PenSa offered no evidence that Bays did not
commence operations in good faith, and the court concluded that the
drilling location work performed in June 2006 satisfied the requirement of the operating agreement that the well be commenced on or
before August 19, 2006.
Bays additionally argued that it could not be considered to be in a
non-consent status because Bays had proposed the wells in question
too late, which violated a requirement in the AMI Agreement stating
that it was "the intent of Bays and PenSa that no well will be proposed
more than 30 days prior to the anticipated spud date."4 The court
observed that to say in a contract that one will attempt to do a given
act does not acknowledge that the party is requiredto do that act. The
2. Bays Exploration, Inc. v. PenSa, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1291 (W.D. Okla.
2011).
3. Id. at 1295 (quoting 21st Century Inv. Co. v. Pine, 734 P.2d 834, 840 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1986)).
4. Id. at 1296.
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court also cited the general rule that "precatory statements of intent
do not alter the express and unambiguous language of a contract."s
Finding that the operative provisions of the underlying contracts concerning well proposals and deadlines were clean and unambiguous,
the court rejected PenSa's attempt to transform an intent recital into
an express contractual requirement.
The next key issue addressed by the court was Bays's request that
the court grant it summary judgment on PenSa's counterclaim for alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Bays relied on both the provisions of
the operating agreements and principles of Oklahoma law to support
its motion. The operating agreements expressly provided that the parties to the agreements "shall not be considered fiduciaries." 6 The
court further found that: "[T]he Oklahoma courts have repeatedly
held that an operator does not owe its non-operating working interest
owners a fiduciary obligation; instead, the duties imposed by a joint
operating agreement are contractual obligations."'
PenSa further argued that operating agreements imposed on Bays,
as operator, a duty of good faith and fair dealing, which Bays violated.
The court first recognized that, under Oklahoma law, the common law
"duty of good faith and fair dealing" does not extend to the contractual relationship created by an operating agreement. However, the
operating agreements at issue in this case expressly provided that the
parties were obligated to act in good faith in their dealings with each
other with respect to the activities under those agreements. Since the
duty of good faith between the parties in this suit arose from the provisions of the contracts, the court concluded that PenSa's cause of action was for breach of contract and not a tort claim. The court granted
summary judgment against PenSa to the extent that it sought recovery
in tort.
B.

Nonoperator sues operator for drilling a "horizontal" well
rather than a "vertical" well.

The case of Summa Engineering, Inc. v. Crawley Petroleum Corp.,
presented the court with a complicated factual history that began with
a new well proposal for a prospect in Jackson County, Oklahoma that
was presented by Summa's representatives to Mack Energy. The proposal called for the drilling of a vertical well and included a number of
other terms and conditions.' Mack Energy and Crawley responded to
the proposal by indicating that they were interested in pursuing
5. Id. at 1297.
6. Id. at 1299 (citing Model Form Operating Agreement, Article VII(A), Bays
Reply Ex. 1 at p. 11).
7. Id. at 1299.
8. See Summa Eng'g, Inc. v. Crawley Petroleum Corp., No. 107,483 (Okla. Civ.
App. July 7, 2011), availableat http://oklegal.onenet.net/oklegal-cgi/ifetch?okca+2313
4217313910+F.
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Summa's prospect, but Crawley and Mack proposed certain additional
and different terms than those set forth in Summa's proposal. A series of additional exchanges occurred between the parties, including
proposals and counter-proposals of various additional terms and
amendments to the agreement. The parties finally reached a final
agreement.
In May 2004, Crawley proposed the drilling of a horizontal well to
Mack under the terms of a separate operating agreement ("JOA")
between those two parties and mailed the representative of Summa a
copy of that letter. Two representatives of Summa responded by separate letters to Crawley and Mack explaining that they thought the well
should be drilled vertically rather than horizontally, for stated reasons.
Several months later, Crawley advised Summa that the horizontal well
had been drilled. Since Summa had a carried working interest to casing point, it asked Summa to confirm its election to participate in the
after-casingpoint operations and completion of the well. Summa
made no election. In a second letter with an Authorization for Expenditure attached, Crawley proposed reentering and deepening the well
and a second lateral to a specific depth. One of Summa's representatives responded and again recommended a vertical well.
In 2006, several years after the well became productive, Summa
sued Crawley and Mack for breach of contract and negligence. The
case proceeded to a bench trial in July 2009. At the close of Summa's
case, the defendants demurred to the evidence, arguing that there was
no requirement in the final agreement to drill a vertical well. The defendants also argued that, as a result of the agreement, the defendants
owned 100% of the leasehold interest and assumed 100% of the risk
and cost of drilling the well and were entitled to drill the well in the
way they chose.
In response, Summa asserted that the negotiations back and forth
between the parties were for changes to the original proposal, and
that the parties were substantially renewing the original proposal,
which was incorporated into the revised versions of the agreement.
The defendants responded that, under basic contract law and OKLA.
STAT. tit 15, § 71, a qualified proposal is a new proposal.
Summa also argued that the defendants had acted imprudently and
were not in good faith in drilling the well because they had been
warned that they were going to have a problem drilling a horizontal
well.
The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer. Summa
appealed.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the court of appeals
found as follows:
The defendants argued that Summa's initial proposal (which required the drilling of a vertical well) was rejected by the defendants'
counter-offer and the subsequent offers and counter-offers, and that
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol18/iss3/18
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the final agreement did not expressly or impliedly include the requirement that the well be drilled vertically. The court agreed, finding that the defendants offered new terms that completely changed
the proposal and constituted a rejection or counter-proposal.
Summa additionally argued that the defendants breached the agreement by improperly imposing a casingpoint election when no casing
point had been reached, then unilaterally absorbing Summa's carried
working interest in the well when Summa did not make an election.
The court disagreed. The court found that the agreement imposed no
conditions or requirements regarding the defendants' determination
of when casing point had been reached. The court further observed
that Summa did not object to the defendants' casing point definition
when Summa received the notice letter, and did not object to the request that Summa make an election.
Summa finally argued that the defendants were negligent in drilling
the horizontal well because Summa warned them that they would not
hit the target zone. The court found that there was no evidence that
the defendants' decision to drill a horizontal well was made in bad
faith or was performed negligently, unreasonably, or without due diligence. To the contrary, Summa's own evidence established that the
well was productive.

II. OIL

AND GAS LEASE CANCELLATION, TERMINATION, AND
BREACH OF OBLIGATION CASES (OTHER THAN ROYALTY)
A. Court reviews claims that oil and gas leases terminated due to
seventeen-year absence of gas sales and for other causes.

In Concorde Resources Corp. v. Kepco Energy, Inc., the PCC defendants, as owners of oil and gas leasehold rights, drilled a well in
1981.9 The well was shut-in in 1982. In 1990, Concorde acquired new
oil and gas leases from the PCC defendants. Concorde deepened the
well in that same year. However, from 1990 to 2008, Concorde did
not perform any other activities in connection with the well, and made
no expenditures for the operation and maintenance of the well or for
exploratory activities. From 1990 to July of 2008, Concorde sold no
gas from the well. Concorde's explanation for the inactivity was that
there was no pipeline connection available for the well until July 2008.
Concorde further alleged in its defense that shut-in royalties were
paid or tendered from 1993 to 2007 and that it sold gas from the well
in at least July, August, and September of 2008, which generated revenues in the approximate amount of $24,000.
In 2006 and 2007, Kepco, Williams, and Mahalo acquired oil and gas
leases covering the same interests as Concorde's leases. The competing leases led to Concorde filing the present quiet title lawsuit in
9. Concorde Res. Corp. v. Kepco Energy, Inc., 254 P.3d 734, 736 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2011).
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which Kepco, Williams, and Mahalo, as defendants, counterclaimed
for a judicial determination that Concorde's leases had expired. The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Kepco, Williams,
and Mahalo. Concorde appealed.
In reviewing the trial court's decision, the appellate court focused
on three arguments that had been raised by the defendants.
First, Concorde relied upon the well drilled in 1981 under the old
lease as being sufficient under the terms of the new oil and gas leases
to continue and maintain those leases in effect. The court noted that
Williams, alone, argued that an "existing" well drilled under a prior
lease could not be relied upon to hold "new" oil and gas leases. The
court of appeals found that Williams cited no authority for that proposition, and rejected it.
Second, the court considered the contention that Concorde's oil and
gas leases had expired under the habendum clauses of those leases
because of the absence of any well capable of producing in paying
quantities. Kepco, Williams, and Mahalo pointed to the undisputed
total absence of production for seventeen years, and also argued that
the well was incapable based upon the condition of the equipment and
lack of well pressure. Concorde disputed the latter allegations. In addition to providing reserve estimates, Concorde argued that the gas
sales in the amount of approximately $24,000 over three months in
2008 showed that the well was capable of production in paying quantities. The court of appeals concluded that the foregoing gave rise to
issues of fact concerning the ability of the well to produce in paying
quantities that precluded the granting of summary judgment on this
issue.
Finally, the court assessed the argument of Kepco, Williams, and
Mahalo that Concorde's leases should be cancelled due to Concorde's
alleged breach of the implied covenant to market. Concorde's explanation for the total absence of marketing for a period of seventeen
years was that there was no pipeline to which the well could be connected and no owner made any demand during that period of delay in
the marketing of production. Concorde presented an affidavit stating
that it actively sought a market and a pipeline, but the affidavit provided no details. The defendants argued that the conclusory nature of
the affidavit did not suffice to demonstrate that an issue of fact existed. The court agreed and found that Concorde had failed to
demonstrate that it acted with any degree of reasonable diligence to
market the gas. As a result, unless issues of fact were presented as to
other defenses of Concorde, the defendants would be entitled to summary judgment.
The court turned to Concorde's other defenses. Concorde
presented evidentiary materials showing payment or tender of shut-in
royalties to the lessors over the years in question. The defendants argued that the shut-in royalty payments were not relevant since the
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol18/iss3/18
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well was not capable of producing in paying quantities. The court
found: " 35 The lessors acceptance of the shut-in royalty benefits
from Concorde before a cancellation action is brought works an estoppel to deny Concorde's title when such benefits are accepted
before the cancellation suit is commenced.""o Concluding that there
were issues of fact concerning Concorde's shut-in royalty payment defense as to all of the lessors except for the lessor Smith, the court
found that this defense could not be adjudicated on a summary judgment basis.
With regard to Concorde's additional defense that a prior demand
was necessary to a lease cancellation action and that no demand had
been made by the lessors, the court considered a letter that the lessor
Smith had sent Concorde in 1991 and related circumstances. The
court held that issues of fact existed with respect to this defense that
precluded granting summary judgment on the claim for breach of implied covenant.
The court reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of
Kepco, Williams, and Mahalo and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings on the issues described above.
B.

Court affirms lower court's finding that oil and gas leases
expired due to a cessation in the capability of commercial
productionfor an unreasonablylong period of time, under the
temporary cessation of production doctrine.

The case of Strat Land Exploration Co. v. Aexco Petroleum, Inc.,
involved a lawsuit by Strat seeking a judicial determination that certain oil and gas leases of Aexco and Mewbourne that were executed in
1963, 1965, and 1966 had expired under the terms of their habendum
clauses." The trial court's findings and conclusions were described by
the appellate court, in part, as follows:
Following a lengthy hearing, the trial court entered an Order finding
the leases were more than thirty-five years past their primary terms
and they contain no cessation of production clauses; the well ceased
production in July, 2003 and the gas meter was removed; the well
produced no gas or oil for thirty months; no efforts to restore commercial production were made for over twenty-seven months; and
"the lease road and location grew up with weeds." The trial court
found the well was noncommercial during the thirty month cessation period, the well was incapable of producing commercial quantities during this cessation period, the defendants "were not diligent
in working to restore the leases to commercial production," and the
10. Id. at 740 (citing Danne Exploration & Prod., Inc., 883 P.2d 210, 218 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1994)).
11. Strat Land Exploration Co. v. Aexco Petroleum, Inc., No. 105,150, at
14
(Okla. Civ. App. Apr. 8, 2011), availableat http://oklegal.onenet.net/oklegal-cgi/ifetch
?okca+22945214465333+F.
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cessation period was an unreasonable time for the well to be off
production. The trial court found the leases were a cloud and slander on title and the leases should be cancelled effective September
1, 2005. Title was quieted and judgment was entered in favor of
Strat Land and against Aexco, Mewbourne, and the other named
defendants pursuant to 12 O.S. 1141 (2001), the Non-Marketable
Title Procedures Act (12 O.S. 1141.1 (2001), et seq.), and for slander
of title pursuant to 16 O.S. 79 (2001).12
Aexco and Mewbourne appealed. The appellants argued on appeal, as they did at trial, that the well holding the leases during their
secondary term had been shut-in, it had not been abandoned, that equitable considerations existed for failing to actually produce from the
well, it was a temporary cessation of production, and the well was capable of commercial production during the "shut in period." They
also argued that Strat Land's cause of action really was about the marketing or the lack of marketing of well production. Mewbourne argued that a demand upon it to produce and market was a condition
precedent to suit and that no such demand was ever made.
The court of appeals found that the appellants' arguments misconstrued the theory of Strat Land's lawsuit because an oil and gas lease
does not end under the habendum clause because a court enters an
order, but rather it ends because of a failure to produce or be capable
of producing in paying quantities. Strat Land sought to quiet title because the well was alleged to be incapable of production in paying
quantities. Strat Land did not seek lease cancellation as a remedy for
breach of the implied covenant to market. One of Strat Land's experts opined that the well was not capable of commercial production
from July 2003 through October 2005, and another witness testified
that providing sufficient pressure to deliver gas to the connected pipeline was Aexco's responsibility as gas seller.
The court concluded that the district court's findings that the well
was not capable of producing in commercial quantities for an unreasonable period of time, and that diligent efforts were not made to restore the lease to commercial production, were not clearly against the
weight of the evidence and were affirmed.
The court of appeals did, however, reverse the district court's finding that Strat Land had properly made demand in conformity with the
Non-Judicial Marketable Title Procedures Act. 13

12. Id. at 1 15.
13. Id. at $ 30 (citing

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS, TRANSACTIONS, AND
TITLE MATTERS

Mineral deed is cancelled based on the omission of the buyergrantee to disclose certain facts to the seller-grantor in the
negotiation process.

In Harbour Mineral Propertiesv. Pence, the Buyer of an 8.75-acre

mineral interest in Coal County, Oklahoma, sued the Seller for a declaratory judgment decreeing that the contract was valid and in full
force and effect.14
The Seller counterclaimed for cancellation of the deed. The Seller
asserted that the Buyer had made an unsolicited offer to purchase the
minerals, and did purchase the minerals, for $26,250.00. At the time
of the offer, Buyer knew-but Seller did not know-about (a) two
pooling orders covering the subject minerals and providing for a bonus payment of $24,467.39 and royalties; (b) a Mineral Owners Escrow Account ("MOEA") containing monies held for the benefit of
the subject mineral interest; and (c) a producing well with production
attributable to the minerals. The Seller contended that the Buyer had
a duty to disclose those matters but failed to do so, which resulted in
the Buyer acquiring the minerals by constructive fraud.
The Seller also argued that the Buyer failed to comply with the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act" and OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 735:80-72(14) promulgated thereunder, requiring Buyer to notify Seller of
money held in the MOEA for the Seller's benefit.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Seller.
The Buyer appealed. In affirming the ruling of the district court, the
court of appeals observed that a party who volunteers information
which may influence the conduct of another party has the duty of
speaking the whole truth and not suppressing facts within its knowledge. "In particular a purchaser of minerals has the duty of disclosing
production, and failure to do so is a false representation. Deardorfv.
Rosenbusch, 1949 OK 117, 206 P.2d 996, 998. That the Seller had constructive knowledge of production is not a defense to fraudulent
misrepresentation."' 6
The court noted that the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act placed
additional notice requirements on the Buyer.
The court concluded that the Seller had submitted evidence that the
Buyer obtained the Seller's assent to the purchase contract by failing
to disclose that the minerals were in production and that the MOEA
14.
2011),
+F.
15.
16.

Harbour Mineral Props. v. Pence, No. 108,822, at 2 (Okla. Civ. App. Feb. 18,
available at http://oklegal.onenet.net/oklegal-cgilifetch?okca+22892213533787
Id. at
Id. at

3(citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 674 (West Supp. 2012).
10.
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held funds attributable to the mineral interest, and that Buyer did not
submit evidence establishing issues of material fact on those matters.
B.

Court addresses dispute over whether the assignment of oil
and gas lease was a well bore only assignment or whether it
covered the full oil and gas lease.

In Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK Exploration, L.P.," the dispute
focused on the meaning and intent of a 2002 assignment of a 320-acre
oil and gas lease which stated in primary part as follows:
[Assignors] do hereby sell, assign, transfer and set over unto Clydesdale Energy, LLC,

. .

. all right, title and interest in and to that

certain wellbore, all leasehold, limited in depth from the surface of
the earth to the base of the Tonkawa Formation, and all surface and
subsurface equipment and materials thereon and therein, more particularly described as the Claude E. Newell #1 well. Said leases and
well located in the northwest quarter of Section 23-17N-25W, Roger
Mills County, Oklahoma, which wellbore, leases and associated
equipment and materials so specified are hereinafter referred to as
"SAID WELL."18
Some six years after receiving the above assignment, Clydesdale assigned its interest to Plano using the same language. However,
Clydesdale also added an exhibit to its assignment providing a legal
description of the entire lease-a description that did not appear in
the assignment to Clydesdale.
Two months later, the two assignees under the assignment to
Clydesdale conveyed their interests to GHK under instruments that
included a legal description of the entire lease and excepted the 2002
assignment, which was described as a well bore only assignment.
Plano filed the present lawsuit seeking to quiet title to the entire
lease. GHK counterclaimed contending that it owned the 320-acre
lease subject only to what it characterized as a wellbore assignment.
The parties, agreeing that there was no factual dispute and that the
assignment could be interpreted as a matter of law, presented the case
for decision on summary judgment motions. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Plano and held that the later assignment to GHK conveyed nothing. In a divided unpublished decision,
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court, with the dissenting judge
writing a vigorous dissent.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and reviewed the
lower court decisions. In reversing the prior decisions, the Court
found that patent ambiguity arose from the uncertainty as to the parties' intent in their use of the phrase "all leasehold" with there being
no accompanying legal description of the leased premises. The Court
17. Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK Exploration, 250 P.3d 328, 329 (Okla. 2011).
18. Id. at 300.
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delineated at least five possible outcomes from the language that was
used and found that the meaning of the 2002 assignment could not be
determined without extrinsic evidence. Finding that "the lower
courts, in essence, reformed the conveyance by inferring that 'all
leasehold' somehow refers to the entire 320 acre Newell Lease, although the instrument describes the Newell #1 well only," 9 the Court
remanded the case to the trial court for a consideration of extrinsic
evidence concerning the true intent of the parties.
C.

Courtfinds that the key language in two deeds was ambiguous
and that extrinsic evidence should have been considered in
determining the intent of the parties.

The case of MacDonald Oil & Gas, LLC v. Sledd presented the

court with an issue of deed construction on two deeds that reserved or
excepted a one-half interest in the minerals, with each grantor owning
less than one-half of the surface estate and less than one-half the mineral estate.2 0 MacDonald argued that since the deeds reserved to the
grantor an undivided one-half interest in the minerals in the entire 240
acre tract described in the deeds, the grantors effectively reserved all
the minerals owned by them and conveyed only surface rights. However, the successors to the grantees under those two deeds argued
that, since the grantors owned a total of 168 net mineral acres at the
time of the conveyances, the grantors intended to convey one-half, or
84 net mineral acres, to the grantees.
The trial court ruled in favor of MacDonald and found that no minerals were conveyed by the deeds. Sledd appealed.
The appellate court concluded that the deeds were inherently ambiguous regarding the extent to which they conveyed or reserved mineral interests because they were subject to at least two reasonable
interpretations. The court reversed the trial court's ruling that no
minerals had been conveyed and remanded to the trial court, stating
that extrinsic evidence would be examined to determine what the
grantors intended to convey.

IV. GAS
A.

BALANCING CASES

Court addresses statute of limitations issues and cash
balancing rights under gas balancing law principles.

In Sanderson v. Yale Oil Association, Sanderson and other under-

produced owners sought a cash balancing and alleged that the operator's proposed plugging and abandonment of the subject well, and the
fact that certain owners were in fact abandoning the well, triggered
19. Id. at 332.
20. MacDonald Oil & Gas, LLC v. Sledd, 256 P.3d 1018, 1020 (Okla. Civ. App.
2011).
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the provision of the applicable operating agreement which provided
that "in the event production of gas permanently ceases prior to the
time that the accounts of the parties have been balanced, a complete
balancing shall be accomplished by a money settlement."2 1 The overproduced parties declined to balance and instead asserted that Sanderson's claim was time-barred by statutes of limitation. Sanderson
filed the present lawsuit seeking an accounting and damages. The
overproduced defendants specifically alleged in their defense that
Sanderson's claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set
forth in OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 (2001) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 52
§ 570.10 (2001) since more than five years had elapsed between (a)
the date Marathon assigned to Sanderson the already underproduced
interest in the subject well; and (b) the date Sanderson filed the present lawsuit.
At trial, the court, citing Harrell v. Samson Resources Co., concluded that the statute of limitations on a claim for gas balancing "begins to run when there is an ouster or a termination of the cotenancy
relationship between the underproduced party and the overproduced
party." 2 2 The trial court found that the cotenancy relationship between Marathon and the overproduced defendants was terminated
when Marathon sold its interest in the well, and assigned its underproduction claim, to Sanderson, thereby commencing the running of the
limitations period. After observing that enough time had elapsed
since the assignment to Sanderson for both a three-year and five-year
limitations period to have run, the court entered judgment against
Sanderson and for the defendants, finding the Sanderson's claim was
barred.
On appeal, the appellate court found that the Harrell case did not
support the trial court's ruling that the claim of Sanderson was timebarred:
Although the Harrell Court held that limitations began to run on a
claim against the overproduced interest owner when that owner ...
sold or attempted to sell its interest in an out-of-balance well, the
same situation is not present in the case at bar. Significantly, Marathon was underproduced when it sold its interest to [Sanderson].
Under Harrell, had Marathon been overproduced at the time of
sale, the limitations clock would have started ticking on the rights of
all underproduced interest owners to seek cash-balancing from
Marathon. However, no party contends that Marathon has liability
for any part of the overproduction held by the Defendants.2 3
In reversing the trial court's ruling that statutes of limitation barred
Sanderson's claim, the appellate court found that the rules of gas balancing described in the Harrelldecision allowed Sanderson, as the as21. Sanderson v. Yale Oil Ass'n, 246 P.3d 1109, 1110 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
22. Id. at 1111 (citing Harrell v. Sansom Res. Co, 980 P.2d 99, 105 (Okla. 1998)).
23. Id. at 1111.
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signee of an underproduced owner, could wait until the relationship
with the overproduced working interest owners ended before demanding a balancing. As a result, the running of the statute of limitations did not commence upon Marathon's sale of its underproduced
interest to Sanderson over five years earlier.
The overproduced parties additionally argued that the express gas
balancing provisions of the underlying agreement provided that a final
cash balancing cannot occur until "production of gas permanently
ceases," and the subject well was taken over by another owner and
continued to produce since the date the underproduced owners abandoned it. However, the court ruled that if the trial court determines
that the overproduced owners' abandonment of the well repudiated
their "trust relationship" with the underproduced owners, "different
remedies are available and the appropriateness thereof is dependent
upon the facts and equities of the case,"2 4 which were issues for the
trial court upon remand.
B.

Underproduced party asserts conversion claim against
Operator who is alleged to have under-stated the extent of the
plaintiffs underproductionaccount.

The case of ChaparralEnergy, L.L.C. v. Pioneer Exploration, Ltd.,

involved a gas balancing dispute between Chaparral, a nonoperator,
and Pioneer, the operator.25 Chaparral and the operator disagreed as
to whether the conveyance under which Chaparral acquired its interest transferred to Chaparral the "underproduction" account of the assignee that accrued prior to July 1, 2000. The operator computed the
gas imbalance attributable to Chaparral without crediting it with that
portion of the underproduction. Chaparral sued the operator for an
accounting, in-kind or cash balancing, breach of contract, conversion,
and violation of the Natural Gas Market Sharing Act.26 Chaparral
asserted that the operator had tortiously converted the historic underproduction imbalance of Chaparral when it zeroed out the imbalance
instead of transferring it from the assignee to Chaparral.
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the operator as to Chaparral's conversion claim. The court first found that a debt cannot be the subject of a
claim for conversion and, while personal property can be converted,
oil and gas do not become personal property until produced and severed from the leasehold. Moreover, the court observed that the sale
and marketing of gas by one cotenant without the consent of the other
cotenants is lawful and does not constitute conversion on the part of
24. Id. at 1112 (citing Harrell, 980 P.2d at 105-07; Unit Petroleum Co. v. Mobil
Exploration & Prod. N. Am., Inc., 78 P.3d 1238, 1241 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003)).

25. Chaparral Energy, L.L.C. v. Pioneer Exploration, LTD., 241 P.3d 1161,
1161-62 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
26. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 581.1-581.10 (West 2011)).
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either the working interest cotenant or the purchaser.2 7 The court
concluded that "[t]he gas represented by the Historic Imbalance was
not converted because it was produced and sold by a cotenant with
the right to so do." 28 The court held that the underproduction account that had been zeroed out by the operator was not tangible personal property but was instead an accounting entry. Thus, the proper
claim was not one for conversion but was, instead, simply a claim for
accounting and gas balancing-i.e., that the operator had improperly
accounted to its cotenant for the underproduction.
V. SURFACE USE, SURFACE DAMAGES, SURFACE DAMAGES ACT,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
A. Court finds that Oklahoma Corporation Commission order
designating the plaintiff as unit operator was sufficient to
confer standing to file appraisal proceedings under the
Oklahoma Surface Damages Act.
In Charter Oak ProductionCo. v. Morgan,2 9 Charter Oak, as operator of a proposed new well, filed suit seeking the appointment of appraisers to determine surface damages under the Oklahoma Surface
Damages Act.3 0 The surface owners moved to dismiss the action on
the ground that Charter Oak did not have standing to bring the appraisal proceedings because it had not shown that it had ownership of
record of a mineral or leasehold interest. The surface owners relied
upon section 318.2(1) of the Act, which defines an operator as "a mineral owner or lessee who is engaged in drilling or preparing to drill for
oil or gas."31 In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Charter Oak
filed with the court an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission naming it as the designated unit operator. After conducting a
hearing and considering the evidence, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Charter Oak appealed.
The appellate court found that the surface owners' challenge to
Charter Oak's standing as an operator under the Surface Damages
Act constituted an impermissible attack on the order of the Commission that appointed Charter Oak as unit operator. While it was acknowledged that the Commission does not have the jurisdiction to
determine title to interests in real estate, the court found that the
Commission does have the power to, among other things, "receive evidence and determine whether an applicant owns minerals or has the
right to drill in the subject unit."3 2 The Commission is also "vested
27. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 581.1-581.10 (West 2011)).

28. ChaparralEnergy, 241 P.3d at 1164.
29. Charter Oak Prod. Co. v. Morgan, 263 P.3d 325, 325-26 (Okla. Civ. App.
2011).
30. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,

§ 318.2-.9 (West 2011)).

31. Id.
32. Charter Oak Prod. Co., 263 P.3d at 327.
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with exclusive jurisdiction to designate the operator of a drilling and
spacing unit." 33 In reversing the decision below, the court concluded
that the surface owners, and the trial court's ruling sustaining their
motion to dismiss, sought to defeat a final, facially invulnerable Commission order and were, therefore, attempting an impermissible collateral attack on the order.
B.

Courtfinds that exploration and production company did not
show that it was a "pipeline company" entitled to use
condemnation rights under Oklahoma law for purposes of
constructing a pipeline.

In D-Mil Production,Inc. v. DKMT, Co.,34 D-Mil, a Texas corporation, had filed a condemnation action to obtain easements for the construction, operation and maintenance of a natural gas pipeline. The
landowners argued that D-Mil was not a "pipeline company" entitled
to exercise the right of eminent domain under the Oklahoma Statutes.
The district court rejected the landowners' contention. The landowners appealed.
D-Mil contended that, because it had complied with Oklahoma's
general corporation laws and accepted the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission's rules and regulations and applicable statutes, it was entitled to exercise eminent domain to market gas from a well it operated, and that no statute required D-Mil to be specifically designated
as or become a "pipeline company." The appellate court disagreed.
The Court observed "D-Mil's motion provides no explanation of
any of its business activities in Texas beyond mineral leasing. Whether
D-Mil transports or transmits natural gas by means of a pipeline, at
best, is purely conjecture. D-Mil, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.""
The Court concluded: "[W]e find that D-Mil is properly domesticated in Oklahoma as a 'mineral leasing company.' As a matter of
law, however, D-Mil has not met the statutory definition of a "pipeline company" under Oklahoma law. Specifically, D-Mil failed to
demonstrate that it transports or transmits natural gas by means of
pipeline as part of its lawful business activities in the State of Texas.
There was no factual evidence to support the trial court's legal conclusion that D-Mil is a pipeline company."36
The district court's judgment was reversed and the court was directed, on remand, to enter summary judgment in favor of landowner.
33. Id.
34. D-Mil Prod., Inc. v. DKMT, Co., 260 P.3d 1262, 1264 (Okla. 2011) (per
curiam).
35. Id. at 1270.
36. Id.
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Court finds that use of state condemnation statutes to
condemn rights-of-way for electricaltransmissionlines serving
customers in a multi-state area satisfied the requirementfor a
"public use."

In Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Beecher, the court was
presented with a suit to condemn easements for the construction of
electrical transmission lines to wind farms in northwestern
Oklahoma." The transmission line project of which this suit was a
small part sought 200-foot wide rights-of-way running 121 miles across
six Oklahoma counties, from Woodward to Oklahoma City, for the
construction of above-ground high capacity transmission lines for
large amounts of wind-generated electricity. Oklahoma Gas & Electric ("OG&E"), the plaintiff, is a public utility that generates, transmits, and furnishes electric power to approximately 750,000 customers
in Oklahoma and Arkansas.
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission approved the project as
being in the public interest and authorized OG&E to pass the costs of
the project on to its customers. The Southwest Power Pool ("SPP")
also approved the project. The SPP is a regional transmission organization regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. It
was created to coordinate and ensure the reliability of transmission
across a multistate area. OG&E is a member of the SPP.
OG&E began acquiring rights-of-way for the project. When negotiations with the landowners in this case failed, OG&E filed a condemnation action seeking a permanent easement over the landowners'
property. Among other proceedings, the landowners filed an exception to the Commissioners' Report asserting that the proposed taking
by OG&E was for an unauthorized private use and not a public use.
At the hearing on the landowners' exception, OG&E presented detailed evidence to support its contention that the proposed taking involved a public purpose, and the trial court agreed. While the trial
court concluded that the taking also included a private purpose, it denied the landowners' exception. The landowners appealed.
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the court of appeals found in
part as follows: the court first recognized the project would serve both
OG&E's Oklahoma customers and consumers in other states who buy
their electricity from power companies having access to the transmission lines. The court noted that the SPP, and not OG&E, would have
control over the lines.
The landowners first argued that most of the project's electric transmission capacity would be used to benefit customers outside of
Oklahoma who are not Oklahoma citizens. The landowners pointed
to evidence that only 22% of the project's capacity was needed to
37. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Beecher, 256 P.3d 1008, 1009 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2010).
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meet OG&E customer demands through 2020. On this basis, the
landowners argued that OG&E failed to satisfy the "primary beneficiary" test set forth in Board of County Commissioners v. Lowery."

The court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, even if
OG&E's customers used only 22% of the capacity of the line through
2020, the landowners had not presented any evidence that the remaining 78% capacity would actually be used by out-of-state consumers, or
that OG&E would not use most of the line capacity over the effective
life of the project, which was estimated to be fifty to sixty years. Second, the court found that the "primary intended beneficiaries" of the
line were in fact the customers of OG&E.39 The court specifically
found that the Lowery decision did not require that 51% or more of
the electricity transmitted through the project lines had to be used by
the Oklahoma public in order to satisfy the primary beneficiary test.
Rather, the court considers all the factors in the case to determine the
primary intended beneficiaries.
Second, the landowners argued that the project was not a public
purpose because, while OG&E was constructing the transmission line
project and is the owner of it, the SPP will control it and could actually
deny OG&E the right to use the power lines. The court first noted
that, in prior cases involving electrical power and so long as the ultimate use was a public use, the authority to condemn has been approved even where the condemnation suit was brought by an
intermediate agency that would not have control over the facilities. In
the present suit, the court found that nothing in the record suggested
that OG&E would not have access or that OG&E's condemnation
suit was a pretext for using its utility status to benefit out-of-state entities. The mere fact that out-of-state entities may also benefit does not
preclude OG&E's condemnation action.
VI.
A.

CORPORATION COMMISSION RELATED CASES

Court determines that the Corporation Commission had
jurisdiction and authority to determine if applicant in forcepooling action was a party to an operatingagreement with the
respondent that would preclude the compulsory pooling
action.

The case of NBI Services, Inc. v. CorporationCommission involved

a force pooling order of the Commission that was issued on July 22,
2009, with Davis Operating Co. being the applicant. 40 NBI thereafter
filed a Motion to Re-Open, Motion to Stay and to Vacate the pooling
order. In its motion, NBI stated that it had new evidence that affected
the standing of Davis to file its pooling application and affected the
38. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 645-46 (Okla. 2006).
39. Beecher, 256 P.3d at 1012.
40. NBI Servs., Inc. v. Corp. Comm'n, 241 P.3d 685, 688 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
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jurisdiction of the Commission to hear the case. The new evidence
was a 1981 Operating Agreement.
After a hearing on the motion, the ALJ recommended that the motion be granted on the grounds that the 1981 Operating Agreement, if
valid, would invalidate the Corporation Commission's authority to
have entered the pooling order. However, the appellate referee determined that the AL's recommendation should be overturned and
that the motion should be denied.
The Corporation Commission adopted the recommendation of the
appellate referee that NBI's motion be denied on the basis that the
Commission did not have jurisdiction to make factual findings regarding the 1981 Operating Agreement in order to determine whether it
invalidated the Commission's authority to have entered the pooling
order. NBI appealed.
On appeal, NBI argued that Davis was improperly attempting to
force pool a unit, where all the interest owners were subject to an
Operating Agreement, in an effort to obtain better terms for itself
than Davis would be entitled to under the JOA. In reaching its decision reversing the Commission's denial of NBI's Motion to Re-Open,
Motion to Stay and to Vacate, the court of appeals:
observed that the Corporation Commission lacks jurisdiction over
private rights. It found that the applicant in a force pooling proceeding must establish that there is no agreement among the owners
of the oil and gas rights for the development of the property.
The court stated that "[t]he [Corporation Commission], when exercising its adjudicative authority, is the functional analogue of a court
of record with dispute resolution authority conferred by Constitutional grant."4 1 As a result, although the Commission does not have
the authority to adjudicate private rights disputes, it does have the
authority of a court of record to receive evidence and make fact findings to determine whether the dispute is one involving private rights
or public rights. The court noted that "the OCC has the power to
receive evidence and determine whether an applicant owns minerals
or has the right to drill in the subject unit."4 2
Because the Commission did not determine whether, or to what extent, the 1981 Operating Agreement affected its jurisdiction to issue
the pooling order, the court of appeals reversed the order denying
NBI's motion and remanded the case to the Commission to reconsider
NBI's motion and the force pooling order in light of the 1981 Operating Agreement, and to determine whether, and to what extent, the
1981 Operating Agreement affected the pooling order.

41. Id. at 690.
42. Id. at 691.
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Court reverses trial court's finding that the lawsuit should be
dismissed on grounds that the plaintiffs' sole recourse on its
claims would have been through an appeal of the
Commission's force pooling order.

In GrayHorse Energy LLC v. Crawley Petroleum Co., the subject

well had been productive from the Sycamore and Hunton formations
as of May 28, 2008.43 On that date, Crawley (the operator of the well)
proposed to GrayHorse and the other working interest owners that
the well be recompleted in the Third Deese (Gibson Sand) formation.
GrayHorse declined to participate. Crawley then applied to the Corporation Commission for an order pooling the interests of the owners
in the Third Deese (Gibson Sand) common source of supply. The
Commission issued its pooling order, and Crawley proceeded to
recomplete the well after GrayHorse declined to participate in those
efforts as a working interest owner.
GrayHorse thereafter filed a lawsuit against Crawley alleging that
Crawley had converted the casing, pipe, and wellbore to its own use in
recompleting the well, and that Crawley had caused damage to
GrayHorse. The trial court ruled that because the Corporation Commission "has sole authority to adjust the rights and equities and protect correlative rights of all interested parties in proceedings for the
issuance of a pooling order."44 GrayHorse's sole recourse was a
timely appeal of the force pooling order. The trial court granted
Crawley's motion to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. GrayHorse appealed.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the court of appeals
reached the following findings and rulings, among others:
After reviewing a series of prior Oklahoma decisions that have discussed the jurisdictional dividing line between the district courts and
the Commission, the court noted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has previously held that questions in an action concerning the relationship of private parties, their duties, rights and obligations, and the
existence of liability for the breach of such duties are matters particularly within the province of the district court.4 5
Crawley did not dispute that it was using the casing, pipe, and
wellbore. However, Crawley asserted that GrayHorse should have asserted its claims for compensation in the pooling proceeding so that
the Commission could have considered that claim in adjusting the equities, as well as considering GrayHorse's claim that it had suffered
43. GrayHorse Energy LLC v. Crawley Petroleum Corp., 245 P.3d 1249, 1252
(Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
44. Id. at 1253 (citing Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Sledge, 632 P.2d 393, 396 (Okla.
1981)).
45. Id. at 1255.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

19

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 18 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 18

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

606

[Vol. 18

economic injury because the well had ceased producing, albeit temporarily, from the Sycamore and Hunton formations. 4 6
The court stated that Crawley appeared to be basing its arguments
in part on the primary jurisdiction doctrine, which would allow certain
private rights disputes to be resolved by the Commission if the claim
involved issues that fall within the scope of the regulatory scheme of
the Commission and, thus, involve its expertise. However, the court
of appeals found that Oklahoma has not adopted the primary jurisdiction doctrine, and has instead maintained the public rights/private
rights distinction.4 7
The court found that, because GrayHorse sought a remedy only for
the alleged infringement of its private, common law rights, the Commission had no jurisdiction over the dispute. In fact, the court found
that GrayHorse's claims were within the jurisdiction of the district
courts to resolve and, if appropriate, award money damages.4 8
Finding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
suit for the alleged infringement of GrayHorse's common law rights,
the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
C.

Court adjudicates claim of entitlement of working interest
owner who was overlooked and omitted from originalforcepoolingproceedings,and then pooled in a laterproceeding, to
elect to share in the force-pooled acreage derived from the
priorproceeding to which it was not a party.

The case of Woolley v. CorporationCommission involved an appeal

by Woolley of the third order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission force pooling the McAlester and Hunton common sources of supply underlying a forty-acre tract of land.49 The key elements of the
factual backdrop were as follows: In May 2008, Pontotoc completed
the drilling of the Woolley #1-23 well to a depth of 4,100 feet to test
the Hunton. Upon finding that the Hunton was dry, Pontotoc completed the well at 1,631 feet in the McAlester.
The Commission entered its first force pooling order on July 21,
2008, pooling both the McAlester and Hunton. Pontotoc did not
name Woolley as a respondent because its title information did not
indicate that Woolley owned any interest in the unit.
The Commission entered a second pooling order in March 2009 for
the purpose of adding World Export Services as a respondent after
Pontotoc's updated title information showed that it owned working
interest rights in the unit.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1256.
Id.
Id. at 1257.
Woolley v. Corp. Comm'n, 261 P.3d 1181, 1182 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011).
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After receiving a further revised title opinion, showing that Woolley
owned an interest in the same unit, Pontotoc filed an application for a
third force pooling order naming Woolley as a respondent. The court
observed:
Woolley protested the application and moved to dismiss the application as to the Hunton. The parties tried the issues before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on October 7, 2009. The ALJ's report
recommended (1) granting the application, (2) denying the motion
to dismiss the Hunton formation, (3) adopting the cost allocation
method proposed by Pontotoc, and (4) granting Woolley's request
to share in force-pooled acreage.o
The appellate referee affirmed the AU's report, but added a right on
the part of Woolley to make a casing point election. The Corporation
Commission adopted the recommendations of the appellate referee
except as follows:
[Woolley's] request to share in force pooled acreage covered by
prior Orders of this Commission is denied because Protestants were
not a party to the original pooling. However, Protestants are allowed to share in any force pooled acreage available from subsequent wells. [Woolley's] Motion to Dismiss the Hunton common
source of supply is denied.
Woolley appealed.
In support of Woolley's contention that the Commission erred in
refusing to dismiss the pooling application as to the Hunton common
source of supply, she urged that the pooling statute52 does not contemplate the pooling of a known dry hole. Woolley further asserted
that Pontotoc was trying to put Woolley in the position of either (a)
being saddled with her share of the cost of drilling the prior dry hole
to the Hunton or, alternatively, (b) electing to have relinquished her
Hunton participation rights as to future wells. She argued that
Pontotoc abandoned the Hunton as a dry hole, with the result that it
lost its right under the prior pooling orders as to that common source
of supply. The court of appeals found that a force pooling order pools
the working interests in the entire unit as to the named formations,
and not just a single well, and remains in effect until the order ceases
by its own terms or until the last well is plugged and abandoned. The
court affirmed the refusal to dismiss the application as to the Hunton
common source of supply.
Woolley next asserted that the allocation of well costs for the previously drilled well between the McAlester and Hunton common
sources of supply was inequitable and lacked evidentiary support. In
particular, the Commission had approved Pontotoc's use of the "ex50. Id.
51. Id. at 1183.
52. Id. (citing OKLA.

STAT. ANN.
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ploratory tail" method, which allocated to the deeper Hunton only
those costs associated with drilling from the bottom of the McAlester
to the Hunton. Woolley argued that this approach inequitably gave
those participating in the Hunton a "free ride" through the McAlester. Pontotoc's accounting witness claimed that the publication of
the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies ("COPAS") titled
"Well Costs - Allocations and Adjustments, Accounting Guideline
AG-1 (April 2003), recommended the exploratory tail method for
multiple completion wells. The court rejected Woolley's complaints
and held that the Commission was within its authority to determine
the allocation of the well costs.
Finally, Woolley argued that the Commission erred in refusing to
allow Woolley to participate in the force-pooled acreage obtained
under the two prior force pooling orders in which Woolley was not
named as a respondent. Woolley argued that the effect of the Commission's ruling was to punish her for Pontotoc's errors in its early
conclusions as to ownership within the unit and to allow Pontotoc to
profit from its own mistake. The court appeared to agree. It held that
Pontotoc could not equitably claim the right to Woolley's share of the
force-pooled acreage under the original pooling order by virtue of
Pontotoc's own mistake, and that the Commission erred as a matter of
law in refusing to allow Woolley to share in that force-pooled acreage
upon her election to participate under the third pooling order. The
court reversed the Commission's order to that extent but otherwise
affirmed the order.
D.

Court addresses complaint by shallow depth owner that it
should not be required to elect under pooling order covering
deeper depths in which it owned no interest or, alternatively,
forfeit rights in the shallower depths.

In Sundown Energy, L.P. v. Harding& Shelton, Inc., the Court was

presented with a dispute that arose under certain force pooling orders." In November of 1985, the Commission issued a force pooling
order that pooled nine common sources of supply that were the shallower formations underlying the subject 640-acre section of land
("Unit 1"). Harding & Shelton later acquired leasehold interests in
480 acres in unpooled formations that were deeper than those pooled
by the Unit 1 order. In 2004, Harding & Shelton filed an application
seeking to clarify the rights and interests of the mineral owners in the
nine common sources of supply covered by the prior Unit 1 forcepooling order. Harding & Shelton also sought to pool certain deeper
formations not covered by the Unit 1 pooling order.
53. Sundown Energy, L.P. v. Harding & Shelton, Inc., 245 P.3d 1226, 1228-29
(Okla. 2010).
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The Commission entered a pooling order to force pooling the
deeper formations ("Unit 2"), exclusive of the existing Rounds No. 120 well. However, the Commission denied Harding & Shelton's request to pool the shallower Unit 1 formations along with the deeper
Unit 2 formations since the Commission found that such action would
amount to an impermissible collateral attack on the original pooling
order for Unit 1. As a result, Harding & Shelton filed an application
asking the Commission to determine that the 1985 pooling order covering the shallower formations was still in effect, and clarifying the
order in certain respects.
Sundown appealed the resulting order of the Commission and alleged that the Administrative Law Judge erred in finding "that any
party who participated in the initial unit well (the Rounds No. 1-20
well) .

.

. must now participate in all subsequently proposed wells or

surrender its unit working interest except as to the borehole of the
initial unit well and the borehole of any subsequently drilled well in
which it participates."" Sundown owned a working interest in the
shallower formations of Unit 1 but did not own any working interest
in the deeper pooled formations of Unit 2. Harding & Shelton owned
interests in both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The court of appeals was concerned about the prospect that the
Commission's order would require Sundown to put up well costs for a
deeper test well where Sundown owned only rights in the shallower
formations and that, if the deep formations were developed first, Sundown might not be able to recoup its investment until years later when
the well might be recompleted in uphole formations. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission erred in requiring the shallow
depth owners to either participate in drilling operations in the deeper
Unit 2 formations or, in the alternative, forfeit their unit rights under
the 1985 pooling order.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the
court of appeals' decision. In reaching that ruling, the court observed
in part:
[the shallow rights owners] were allowed to participate in any subsequent wells based upon the COPAS cost allocation method of fixing
their proportionate cost of participation. Although production
might be made from the deeper pooled common sources of supply,
it is just as possible that production might be taken from the upper
pooled source of supply in which Sundown holds an interest. Sundown, under the cost allocation method, would only be responsible
for their proportionate cost of production and if they elected to participate, would reap the benefits of the exploration should there be
54. Sundown Energy, L.P. v. Harding & Shelton, Inc., No. 102,248, at 1 10 (Okla.
Civ. App. Aug. 29, 2006), available at http://oklegal.onenet.net/oklegal-cgilifetch?okca
+22935214264819+F.
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production from pooled sources of supply in which they hold an
interest .

. ..

The Court concluded that the Commission's order was supported by
competent and substantial evidence, and it affirmed the order.
55. Sundown Energy, 245 P.3d at 1232.
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